Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 25
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey

Article 9

January 1995

Securities Law - McCormick v. Fund American
Companies: Altering The Total Mix of Information
Made Available During Disclosure In Corporate
Repurchases Of Stock
David E. Wanis

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Securities Law Commons
Recommended Citation
David E. Wanis, Securities Law - McCormick v. Fund American Companies: Altering The Total Mix of Information Made Available During
Disclosure In Corporate Repurchases Of Stock, 25 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1995).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss1/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Wanis: Securities Law

SECURITIES LAW

McCORMICK V. FUND AMERICAN
COMPANIES: ALTERING THE TOTAL MIX OF
INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE DURING
. DISCLOSURE IN CORPORATE
REPURCHASES OF STOCK

I.

INTRODUCTION

In McCormick v. Fund American Companies,l the Ninth
Circuit granted summary judgment to defendant corporation
over plaintiff shareholder's claim that defendant had violated
the Securities Exchange Act2 by misrepresenting or omitting
material information during negotiations to repurchase stock
from plaintiff.3 The court found that in light of plaintiff's status as a "sophisticated business executive,"4 defendant's alleged misrepresentations and omissions did not "significantly
alter the total mix of information made available"5 concerning
the contemplated sale of a subsidiary company of defendant

1. McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1994) (per Fletcher,
J.; the other panel members were Kozinski, J., and Trott, J.).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b) states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [tjo use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . , any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
3. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 884.
4. [d. at 879.
5. [d. at 884.
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corporation. 6
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff, William M. McCormick, was a stockholder in
defendant Fund American Companies (FAC),7 the parent company of Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (FFIC).s
In May 1990, FAC repurchased from McCormick his outstanding shares of FAC stock. 9 Three months later, FAC sold
its full interest in FFIC to Allianz, a large German insurance
company.lO As a result of the sale, the price of FAC stock rose
dramatically, and McCormick consequently requested a price
adjustment on the repurchased stock to reflect the increased
price of FAC shares. 11

6.Id.
7. McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869, 872 (9th Cir. 1994). McCormick
was CEO of Fireman's Fund Insurance Company from 1983 until his resignation
in 1989. At the time of his resignation, McCormick owned approximately 500,000
performance shares and option shares of FAC stock, the vesting period of which
ran through 1991. Id.
8. Id. FFIC was wholly-owned by FAC. Id.
9. Id. at 874. The negotiations for repurchase of McCormick's FFIC stock
began on April 27, 1990. On May 14, 1990, FAC told McCormick that $38 per
share was the last offer FAC would make to McCormick that year and on May
15, McCormick signed the buyout agreement. At the time of the signing, FAC had
disclosed nothing to McCormick concerning its intention to sell some or all of its
interest in FFIC. Id. Upon counsel's advice, the chief financial officer of FAC met
with McCormick on May 16, 1990 to disclose non public information regarding the
sale of FFIC. Id. at 874-75. Specifically included in this disclosure was mention
that the success of the sale would likely cause a considerable increase in the price
of FAC stock. Upon conclusion of the meeting, FAC issued and McCormick signed
an acknowledgment form summarizing the information disclosed. Id. at 874. Although the disclosure meeting took place the day after consummation of the repurchase, McCormick's counsel conceded at oral argument that the parties' understanding at the time would have allowed McCormick to back out of the bargain
after the disclosure. Id. at 875 n.2.
10. Id. at 873-75. Some debate exists as to when negotiations for the sale of
FFIC actually began with Allianz, for the transaction was conducted through the
efforts of an investment banker from Lehman Brothers, and it is unclear when
FAC authorized his representation. Id. at 878-79. Despite McCormick's claims and
a dated retainer agreement to the contrary, the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that
the banker's initial contacts with Allianz were not in representation of FAC. Id.
11. Id. at 875. Due to the sale of FFIC, FAC stock rose from approximately
$31 per share to approximately $50 per share. Id. McCormick's 500,000 shares
thus would have been worth an additional five million dollars had he retained
them. Id. at 874-75.
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Upon FAC's refusal, McCormick instituted proceedings
against FAC, claiming that FAC had omitted and misrepresented material information regarding the likelihood of the
sale of FFIC in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,12 and Code of Federal Regulations Rule
10b-5. 13
The district court granted summary judgment to FAC and
McCormick appealed to the Ninth Circuit.14
III. BACKGROUND
The Securities Act of 1933 proscribes, with exceptions, the
use of any means of interstate commerce or the mails to offer
to sell or buy a security unless the security is registered with
the Securities Exchange Commission. 16 Once registered, the
corporation issuing the security is subject to various disclosure
and reporting requirements, including section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 16 Under this section and its
expansion by Code of Federal Regulations Rule lOb-5, a person
can be liable for materially misleading representations or omissions made in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 17

12. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 872-73. For pertinent provision of Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), see supra note 2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) is the statutory
codification of Securities Exchange Act § 10(b).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994). Rule 10b-5 extends the "employment of manipulative and deceptive devices" to include oral misrepresentations or omissions
and states in part that "lilt shall be unlawful for any person . . . Itlo make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading . . . ." Id.
McCormick also brought claims for violation of state securities laws, breach
of fiduciary duty, fraud, and deceit. The court held that federal standards of materiality applied to these state claims, and dismissed them as well. McCormick, 26
F.3d at 884.
14. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 872.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1988) (Securities Act of 1933, § 5). For exceptions see 28
U.S.C. § 77(c), (d).
16. See supra note 2 for the pertinent text of § 10(b).
17. See supra notes 12-13. See also Jensen v. Kimble, 1 F.3d 1073, 1077 (10th
Cir. 1993) (omissions not materially misleading in light of circumstances).
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In Basic Inc. v. Levinson,18 the United States Supreme
Court considered various tests for determining materiality in
the section lO(b) context. 19 Basic Inc. stemmed from a petition
by the class of former Basic shareholders claiming that Basic
had released false or misleading statements concerning a forthcoming merger. 20 The Court ultimately adopted for section
lO(b) cases the test detailed in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 21 which makes a fact material if there is "a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available. »22 The Court further noted that in cases where the event
in question is speculative, this determination includes a bal18. 485 U.S. 224 (1987).
19. Id. at 231-38. The Court considered three tests: (1) the TSC Industries
test, described infra note 21 and accompanying text; (2) the "agreement-in-principIe" test, under which preliminary merger discussions do not become material
until the would-be merger partners have reached agreement as to the price and
structure of the transaction; and (3) the test used by the court of appeals in that
case, in which information concerning otherwise insignificant developments becomes
material solely because of an affirmative denial of the developments' existence. The
Court expressly rejected the latter two tests. Id. at 237-38.
20. Id. at 226-30. Basic Inc. and Combustion Engineering, Inc. conducted extensive negotiations to merge for approximately two years. During that time, Basic
made three public statements denying that any merger negotiations were taking
place or that it knew of any facts that would account for heavy trading activity in
its stock. Each member of the class of plaintiffs sold their stock between the first
statement denying a merger and the suspension of trading activity just prior to
the merger announcement. They filed suit based on section lO(b) violations. Id.
21. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). TSC Industries considered the materiality of information presented in a joint proxy statement issued to shareholders of defendant corporations National Industries and TSC Industries. National bought a 34% voting
interest of TSC from TSC's founder and principal shareholder. The founder
promptly resigned from the board of directors of TSC and five National nominees
were subsequently elected. The board thereafter approved a proposal to liquidate
and sell TSC's assets to National. TSC and National issued a joint proxy statement to their shareholders recommending approval of the proposal, which was
ultimately obtained, and the liquidation and sale were effected. Plaintiff was a
TSC shareholder who filed suit against TSC claiming that the joint proxy statement was incomplete and materially misleading in violation of Securities Exchange
Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988). Plaintiff asserted that the statement omitted material facts relating to the degree of National's control over TSC and to the
favorability of the terms of the proposal. Id. at 440-43.
22. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976». The Court in TSC Indus. stated
that to alter the total mix of information, there must be a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. TSC
Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
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ancing of the magnitude of the corporate event and the likelihood that the event will occur.23 The Court concluded by noting that materiality is fact-specific and must therefore be determined on a case-by-case basis.24
Kohler v. Kohler CO. 25 also addressed section lO(b) disclosure requirements. In Kohler, the Seventh Circuit was confronted with the question of whether section lO(b) applied to
entities other than persons with material, non public information. 26 The court held that while the text of section lO(b)
speaks only to "person[s],"27 the provision's requirements "apply not only to majority stockholders of corporations and corporate insiders, but equally to corporations themselves. "28

Despite this clear progression of section lO(b) analysis,
precedent could not provide a summary answer for the question McCormick presented to the Ninth Circuit.29 The facts
indicated, and McCormick did not contest, that the possibility
of the sale of FFIC was disclosed to him.30 McCormick's contention was that FAC had omitted and misrepresented material information concerning the likelihood of the sale of FFIC
which, if properly disclosed, would have altered the total mix
of information. 31

23. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 238 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968».
24. Id. at 238-41.
25. 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). In Kohler, defendant Kohler Co., a corporation, repurchased plaintiff shareholder's stock. Plaintiff claimed a violation of section 10(b) asserting that the book value of the stock differed according to the
accounting method utilized in determining the price; that defendant utilized a
method that caused the lower price to be reflected; and that defendant knew this
to be true but failed to inform plaintiff before repurchasing plaintiffs securities.
Id. at 635-37.
26. Id. at 637-38.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78 j(b) (1988) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b».
28. Kohler, 319 F.2d at 638. The court emphasized that in such cases the duty
to disclose is necessarily limited to an exercise of fair and honest business practices under all the circumstances existing at the time of the transaction. Id. at 641.
29. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 877.
30. Id.; see supra note 9.
31. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 877.
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In examining plaintiffs claim, the Ninth Circuit first considered whether FAC had a duty to disclose material information to McCormick, and then appraised the materiality of
FAC's alleged misrepresentations and omissions. 32
A.

FAC OWED A DUTY OF DISCLOSURE TO MCCORMICK

The Ninth Circ;uit applied the well-established principle
that a corporate issuer has a duty to either disclose nonpublic,
material information to its stockholders or refrain from repurchasing its securities. 33 However, the court's inquiry into this
aspect of McCormick's claim was only cursory, for the duty
element of section lO(b) was not strenuously contested by
FAC. 34 Accordingly, the court held that FAC owed a duty to
McCormick, but emphasized that the crux of the case revolved
around the materiality of the information at issue. 35
B.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LIKELIHOOD
OF SALE OF FFIC WOULD NOT HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY
ALTERED THE TOTAL MIX OF INFORMATION MADE
AVAILABLE TO MCCORMICK

The Ninth Circuit reiterated that the Basic Inc. v.
Levinson test for materiality in the section lO(b) contexeS
makes a fact material if there is "a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by

32. [d. at 875.
33. McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1994); see, e.g.,
Smith v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567, 1572-75 (11th Cir. 1990); Kohler v.
Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1963); Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 437
F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
34. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 875. The court notes that FAC's conduct of having
the disclosure meeting with McCormick indicated that it recognized a duty to
disclose, but that FAC "distanced" itself from that position during oral arguments
and in the course of litigation. The court summarily held that the original position
was the correct one. [d. at 875-76.
35. [d. at 876.
36. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-32 (1988) (adopting holdings from
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) and SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulfur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969».
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the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
'total mix' of information made available."37 The court also
acknowledged Basic [nc.'s balancing test. 3S The Ninth Circuit
then examined the eight alleged omissions and seven alleged
misrepresentations to determine whether they singly or as a
whole were both material and misleading.39
Throughout its analysis, the court explicitly and implicitly
stressed the importance of the plaintiff as a "sophisticated
business executive.,,40 The court noted that "McCormick was a
sophisticated businessman, and he was the former CEO of
FFIC and a direetor of FAC at the time of the events in question. His reading of the Acknowledgement must be seen
against that background."41 Consequently, the court considered McCormick's sophistication as it determined the materiality of each alleged omission and misrepresentation. 42
37. McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1994); see supra
note 21 and accompanying text.
38. Id. The test weighs the magnitude of the corporate event in question
against the likelihood that the event will occur. Id.
39. Id. at 878-83. The eight alleged omissions were: (1) FAC retained Lehman
Brothers, as of January 15, to sell FFIC; (2) in February, FAC committed in writing to entertain the sale of FFIC; (3) FAC pursued Allianz and conducted face-tofaee negotiations in Germany; (4) nonpublic information had already been furnished to Allianz; (5) after review of nonpublic information, Allianz asked for further discussions; (6) FAC had agreed to buy back FFIC portfolio assets; (7) FAC
had agreed to reinsure up to 50% of FFIC's reserves; and (8) FAC and Lusardi
[investment banker from Lehman Brothers] had planned meetings with a tax expert to discuss post-sale holding company issues. Id.
The seven statements that McCormick alleged were misrepresentations were:
(1) a confidentiality letter was sent to Allianz; (2) preliminary discussions were
about to start; (3) the buyer's due diligence had not yet begun; (4) Byrne [CEO
and chairman of the board of FAC] did not know about the Allianz developments
when he proposed the buyout on April 27; (5) Byrne did not want to sell FFIC,
(6) the potential buyer could not meet Byrne's price; and (7) the Allianz development was a sudden one, and was unlikely to materialize. Id.
40. Id. at 879-84. The court borrowed this terminology from Jensen v. Kimble,
1 F.3d 1073, 1078 n.9 (lOth Cir. 1993), in which the Tenth Circuit held that no
liability existed because the defendant there had "specifically advised" the plaintiff
of the points which would not be disclosed.
41. Id. at 884.
42. Id. at 878-83. The Ninth Circuit placed explicit emphasis on McCormick's
sophistication in its analysis of the third and fifth alleged omissions. Id. at 879-80.
The court also placed implied emphasis on McCormick's sophistication in its analysis of the fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth alleged omissions and the first and
fifth alleged misrepresentations. In each of these latter instances, the court stated
that McCormick should have or could have inferred the information claimed unavailable from the information already known to him. [d. at 880-82. For further
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In each instance, the court's determinations fell into one of
three categories: (1) the alleged omissions or misrepresentations were not, in light of the circumstances, actually omissions
or misrepresentations;43 (2) the alleged omissions or misrepresentations were not material;44 or (3) the alleged omissions or
misrepresentations were material, but in light of the circumstances, not misleading. 45 Since the court therefore determined that the alleged misrepresentations and omissions, both
individually and as a whole, did not significantly alter the total
mix of information made available, the court concluded that
FAC did not violate section 10(b).46

v. CRITIQUE
Despite the case-by-case analysis of Securities Exchange
Act section 10(b) claims,47 some practical problems cannot be
avoided. One such problem is that the courts have the luxury
of analyzing a situation retrospectively. What may seem immaterial in light of the circumstances after the fact may have
been highly probative during the transaction. McCormick illustrates this predicament, as the issue here was the materiality
of information allegedly omitted or misrepresented concerning
the likelihood of the sale of FFIC.46 As noted, the likelihood of
the event in question is one prong of determining whether
undisclosed or misrepresented information is material. 49 If

discussion of the role of the "sophisticated business executive" in determining mao
teriality, see infra notes 51·53 and accompanying text.
43. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 878-83. The court held that the information of the
second alleged omission was not true, and thus FAC could not be faulted for omitting it. Id. at 879. The court further held that the statements complained of in
the second, third, and sixth alleged misrepresentations did not amount to legal
misrepresentations. Id. at 881-83.
44. Id. at 878-83. For the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth alleged
omissions, and the fourth, fifth, and seventh alleged misrepresentations, the court
held that the statements would not have significantly altered the total mix of
information, and thus were immaterial as a matter of law. [d.
45. Id. at 880-81. The court held that in light of the information which was
provided to McCormick, the third alleged omission and the first alleged misrepresentation were not misleading. Id.
46. Id. at 883-84.
47. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238-41 (1988); see supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
48. McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869, 87'1 (9th Cir. 1994).
49. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf
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information concerning the likelihood itself is at issue, application of a test based upon that likelihood becomes questionable. 50
Other facets of the McCormick analysis are also noteworthy. At various points in the court's discussion, the Ninth Circuit holds the information immaterial based on the plaintiffs
status as a "sophisticated business executive. "51 This condition
is important, as each case is decided in light of the surrounding circumstances,52 but the court's virtually conclusive reliance suggests a two-tiered system of analysis for materiality:
one test for the reasonable investor and another less demanding one for the "executive. "53
Finally, the Ninth Circuit gives only cursory notice to the
fact that the disclosure took place after the sale of the stock. 54
The circumstances suggest, however, that the court should
have assigned greater weight to this detail. Because he had

Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2nd Cir. 1968».
50. The difficulties inherent in a retrospective attempt to discern the "likelihood" of a speculative event are evident in the court's analysis. In addressing the
sixth and seventh alleged omissions and the seventh alleged misrepresentation, the
court reasons that because negotiations "nearly broke down in the middle of July,"
statements discounting the likelihood of the sale of FFIC made in May, the time
of repurchase, would not be materially misleading. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 880-81,
883. The court thus used information not yet available in May to assess the likelihood of the sale of FFIC at that time. Id.
51. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 878-84; see supra notes 40-42 and accompanying
text for the court's explicit and implicit reliance on this characteristic. The court's
analysis here is somewhat confusing. The conclusions seem to indicate that materiality is inversely proportional to the sophistication of the stockholder. However,
unless this case is merely the exception to the rule, the facts here do not support
such a scheme. As a "sophisticated business executive," in light of the information
disclosed, McCormick still thought the sale so unlikely that he forewent the opportunity to earn an additional five million dollars. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 874-75.
52. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1963); see supra note 28.
53. This is exemplified in the third alleged omission, in which the court held
that FAC's "quasi-disclosure" was sufficient in light of plaintiffs background. Id. at
879. Other courts have rejected that different standards might apply depending on
the level of sophistication of the parties to the transaction. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1988) (finding "no authority in the statute, the
legislative history, or our previous decisions, for varying the standard of materiality depending on who brings the action or whether insiders are alleged to have
profited").
54. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 874-75. McCormick and FAC consummated the sale
of the stock on May 15, 1990. Id. at 874. The disclosure meeting took place on
May 16, 1990. [d. at 874-75.
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already signed one agreement to sell, McCormick had indicated
to FAC his commitment to sell the stock. 55 FAC thus enjoyed
a superior bargaining position over McCormick during the
disclosure meeting. In light of this indicated commitment and
superior bargaining position, it was FAC's interest to keep
disclosure to a minimum, for the transaction represented
roughly five million dollars profit. 56 Since McCormick could
have avoided the agreement,57 FAC clearly wanted to offer
him no reason to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit held that FAC had not violated the
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act. 58 The court concluded that as a matter of law any additional information
disclosed to McCormick concerning the likelihood of the sale of
FFIC would not have significantly altered the total mix of
available information, and the information that was disclosed
was not materially misleading, particularly in light of
McCormick's business sophistication. 59 Consequently, the
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to FAC. 60

David E. Wanis'

55. [d.
56. [d.
57. [d. at 875 n.2.
58. McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., 26 F.3d 869, 884 (1994).
59. [d. at 883·84.
60. [d. at 885.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1996.
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